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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MONA C. HUDSON, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. l, 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM- ) 
P ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7449 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court at Salt Lake City, Utah by the plaintiff, a resident 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, seeking to recover damages 
from the defendant as a result of injuries sustained by her 
in a crossing accident which occurred on May 1, 1948, near 
Logandale, Nevada, at a time when an automobile driven 
by one Era Jones, in which plaintiff was riding as a pas-
senger, collided with a freight train operated by the de-
fendant company. 
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At the conclusion of all of the evidence the defendant 
made a motion for a directed verdict on the following 
grounds: 
1. That the evidence did not show any negli-
gence on the part of the railroad company; 
2. That negligence, if any, on the part of the 
railroad company was not in any way a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries; 
3. That the evidence affirmatively showed that. 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law; and 
4. That the evidence affirmatively and con-
clusively showed that the driver of the car, Era Jones, 
was negligent as a matter of law and that her negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of the accident 
(R. 269). 
After listening to arguments upon the motion, the 
court, without specifying which of the four points he re-
lied upon, granted defendant's motion and directed the jury 
to return a verdict in favor of the defendant. Judgment was 
entered thereon in favor of the defendant and from that 
judgment the plaintiff has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as recited by counsel for appel-
lant in their brief is in the main correct, but in some in-
stances the appellant has misstated facts, and in a great 
many instances has avoided reference to facts which are 
controlling and which are as binding upon plaintiff as upon 
the defendant. In connection with their statement of facts 
counsel for appellant have included some measure of ar-
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gument, and for that reason respondent in stating the facts 
. will likewise include some measure of argument in point-
ing out additional facts or in referring to matters wherein 
respondent feels that the facts differ from those as stated 
by appellant's counsel. 
At the outset, we admit that the facts must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to appellant, but in doing so, 
the entire facts in the case must be considered and not just 
those plaintiff or her witnesses .may have testified to. Also 
in some instances which we will point out, facts as claimed 
by plaintiff and testified to by her or her witnesses were 
-. in direct conflict with physical facts as shown by actual 
surveys and photographs, in which event we are sure that 
the rules require that physical facts and circumstances 
control rather than testimony from the plaintiff or her 
witnesses to the contrary. 
The accident occurred in a very sparsely settled region, 
and the pictures as introduced in evidence, being Exhibits 
1 to 8, show very definitely the nature of the crossing and 
surrounding terrain from a photographic standpoint, and 
a survey map introduced as defendant's Exhibit 10 shows 
the relative elevations of the railroad track and the high-
way as it approaches and crosses, with contour elevations 
of the entire surrounding area. 
It is rather interesting to note that appellant's counsel 
in stating their facts and writing their brief evade any 
mention whatsoever of the map, defendant's Exhibit 10. 
Counsel for defendant tried to get plaintiff to stipulate to 
put the map in evidence early but was unsuccessful, and 
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plaintiff's counsel seemed to want to avoid having the 
record show the qualifications of the surveyor or engineer 
who drew it (R. 134-138). At any rate, appellant's counsel 
referred only to a rough sketch made by Sheriff Keate and 
introduced as plaintiff's Exhibit A, which was made from 
memory by the sheriff without any measurements and not 
to scale in any respect, and the sheriff was not in any 
manner a surveyor or engineer. For that reason respon-
dent is going to insist throughout that the sketch or rough 
map as drawn by the sheriff and introduced as plaintiff's 
Exhibit A cannot be considered as competent evidence in 
any manner contradictory to or disproving anything shown 
by defendant's Exhibit 10, drawn from an actual survey 
by a competent surveyor engineer who made the survey 
(R. 134-138). 
The plaintiff and her driver knew of the location of 
the railroad track in question. They had just crossed it a 
few minutes before the accident and were approaching it 
on their return, knowing that they would have to recross 
it. The plaintiff seems to try to excuse herself by stating 
that she thought it was merely a side and not a main line 
track. She stated (R. 80) : "I thought it was the Wells 
siding." She also stated that she did not expect a train 
to be going in that direction in the afternoon because she 
thought the train went down in the morning and back in 
the afternoon ( R. 83) . Nevertheless, there is no dispute 
over the fact that both the plaintiff and her driver had 
been over the track just a few minutes before, were re-
tracing their path, knew they had to recross it, and also 
knew where the point of crossing was. 
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_., 
\\'e agree with appellant, as stated on page 4 of her 
"" brief, that the course of the road, its location and elevation, 
are of importance not only insofar as the issue of contribu-
tory negligence is concerned, but also upon the question 
of the negligence of the driver being the sole proximate 
cause. 
The course of the road, its location and elevation, and 
the comparative elevation of the surrounding terrain are 
all shown by the contour map, Exhibit 10, as well as the 
- pictures above referred to, the roadway being more par-
ticularly shown by Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 7. The condition 
and elevation of the roadway north of the so-called ravine 
is immaterial because after the automobile came up out 
of the ravine there was still a distance of approximately 
400 feet to the crossing. This point where the automobile 
was out of the ravine can be definitely determined to be 
at the point as shown on the map marked on the roadway 
with the letters and figures "El. 98.2." From that point 
until a point about 75 feet from the tracks, the automobile 
was following a downhill course, and if there was any 
negligence that could be considered a proximate cause of 
the accident on the part of either of the occupants of the 
car or of the members of the train crew, it would arise as 
a result of action or inaction on the part of the various 
parties during the time the automobile proceeded this dis-
tance of approximately 400 feet to the crossing and while 
the train was proceeding approximately the same distance 
to the crossing, both the train and the car proceeding at a 
fairly slow rate of speed. 
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Appellant's counsel refer, on pages 5 and 6, to state-
ments made by Sheriff Keate to the effect that the road 
was considerably lower than the track and that in order to 
see a train on the track occupants of an automobile would 
have had to look "straight up" or "up at an angle." As 
already stated, Sheriff Keate had made no measurements 
in the area and was not a surveyor, and his testimony with 
respect to distances, contour of the terrain or obstructions, 
cannot prevail against the actual survey as made and shown 
by the contour map, Exhibit 10, nor against what is shown 
by the photographs, Exhibits 1 to 8. While the sheriff says 
that the occupants of the automobile would have to look 
"straight up," the true situation is reflected by the fact that 
as the automobile came to the top of the rise out of the 
ravine (at the point on the map marked on the roadway 
"El. 98.2") , there was a difference in elevation between 
the roadway and the railroad track of less than two feet, 
the roadway elevation at that point being 98.2 and the rail-
road track being 100. 
At page 5 counsel, quoting Sheriff Keate, say: "As the 
road comes up out of the ravine, it is more or less facing 
the track. The track can be seen head on, but there is a 
hill or ridge which prevents anyone in a car from seeing 
north along the track at this point." Again counsel say: 
"The fact * * * that even as the car came up out of 
the ravine (facing the tracks) the tracks to the north were 
hidden from view is important because, as will be herein-
after noted in detail, there is evidence from which the 
jury could have found that the train was behind (north of) 
the car as the car came out of the ravine." The physical 
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facts as shown by the map, Exhibit 10, and the pictures, 
conclusively dispute the testimony of Sheriff Keate as at-
tempted to be relied upon by appellant's counsel in this re-
spect. \Vhen the automobile arrived at the point of eleva-
tion marked "El. 98.2" on the roadway where it was out of 
the ravine, it can be seen by drawing a direct line on the 
map, Exhibit 10, that there could not possibly be anything 
other than a two-foot elevation intervening between that 
point and the track as far back as Engineer's Station 444 
as shown on the map, and at Engineer's Station 444 as 
shown on the map, the elevation of the track was approxi-
mately 100.2 feet. Therefore, it would have been impos-
sible for anyone to look from the point on the map marked 
on the roadway "El 98.2" to the right without being able 
to see anything at least as far northerly or to the northwest 
along the track as the Engineer's Station 444, and this would 
be disregarding the fact that an engine such as the one in-
volved in this case stands from 14 to 16 feet above the rails. 
These facts are further conclusively shown by the picture 
in evidence, Exhibit 6, which was taken from the roadway 
just to the north of the bend as the roadway heads toward 
the ravine, which picture shows a man on the track at a 
poin,t 575 feet from the crossing (R. 147), and not only 
can the man be seen standing at that point, but except for 
a small bush, the track itself can be seen for that distance. 
It must further be remembered that if the railroad train 
was in the vicinity, as it would have to have been when 
speed and distances are considered as hereinafter pointed 
out, an engine standing 14 to 16 feet above its rails, (R. 
182-183), could not help but be seen by any person who 
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looked as plaintiff claims to have looked (Exhibit 6). 
Counsel for appellant state on page 8 that: "There is evi-
dence from which the jury could have found that the train 
was not on the tracks at that point, but that it was north, 
and behind this hill. as the car came out of the ravine.'' 
What is the evidence referred to by counsel? It is the state-
ment of Mrs. Hudson (R. 104) wherein she said that she 
looked as they came out of the cut or the ravine. 
"Q. You say you looked as you came out of the 
ravine? 
"A. Yes. 
* * * * * 
"Q. When you came out of the ravine both of 
you could see the track directly ahead of you? 
"A. We could see the track. 
* * * * * 
"A. I looked as we came out of the ravine, I 
knew the track was there, I wasn't conscious of i~ 
but I looked naturally. 
"Q. When you came out of the ravine? 
"A. Yes." 
The only other evidence referred to by counsel is a 
statement from the witness Oliver that when the car came 
out of the ravine and turned along the parallel strip it was 
slightly ahead of the train. That does not mean that the 
train was "not on the tracks at that point" or that "it was 
north and behind this hill." The speeds at which the ob-
jects traveled and the fact that they collided at the crossing 
conclusively prove that the train was not behind any hill 
but had to be in plain sight, and if the plaintiff looked, as 
she claims to have done, as she came out of the ravine, she 
would have had to see the train there in plain view. Thus 
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where counsel state that there was evidence from which 
the jury could have found that the train was not on the 
tracks at that point, we must say that the jury could not 
have so found because it was contrary to physical facts, 
and testimony of plaintiff or anyone else that is contrary 
to demonstrated physical facts is not sufficient for a jury 
to base any finding on. If the plaintiff looked as she states 
she did as the car came to the top of the ridge out of the 
ravine, she was bound to see what was there to be seen, 
and the train had to be there--it could not possibly have 
collided with the automobile otherwise. 
At this point we would like to refer to the facts regard-
ing speed and distances traveled, some of which were re-. 
ferred to by counsel under the heading, "Movement of the 
Car and Train," beginning on page 6 of their brief. The 
speed of the car was estimated by various witnesses as 
being some 18 to 20 or 22 miles per hour (R. 191-192, 201, 
219, 239). The speed of the train was estimated as being all 
the way from 15 to 20 miles per hour (R. 158, 165, 190, 
219, 238). The plaintiff claims never to have seen the 
train until the moment of impact and therefore could not 
estimate its speed, and most of the testimony with respect 
to the speed of the car came from members of the train 
crew. However, from the contour elevation as shown on 
the map, Exhibit 10, it cannot be disputed that anyone on 
the roadway coming up out of the ravine at the time he 
reached the point marked "El. 98.2" on the roadway, would 
be able to see to the north at least as far as Engineer's 
Station marked on the map as 444. From those two points 
the distances to the crossing are as follows: along the 
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roadway an automobile would have to travel approximately 
400 feet; the train from Station 444 would have to travel 
approximately 530 feet. As an automobile approached 
closer to the track and approximately at the point where 
it would turn to the southeast to parallel the track as shown 
by the picture, Exhibit 6, anyone in the automobile looking 
to the right at all would be able to see an approaching train 
at least a distance of 575 feet from the crossing because 
a train could at all events be seen as easily as the man stand-
ing in the picture, Exhibit 6. With these distances in mind 
and considering the speeds as testified to, the facts would 
be conclusive to show the following: 
If the automobile traveled the 400 feet to the crossing 
at 18 miles per hour, which is the closest estimate favorable 
to the plaintiff that could be taken, the automobile, travel-
ing at 26.4 feet per second, would take approximately 15 
seconds to reach the crossing. Taking the highest speed 
testified to with respect to the train and assuming the train 
was moving at 20 miles an hour, in those same 15 seconds 
the train, going at 29.3 feet per second, would travel 440 
feet. Therefore, at the time the automobile came out of 
the ravine and reached the point marked on the roadway 
as "El. 98.2," the engine of the train had to be at least as 
close to the crossing as to be approximately at the station 
marked along the track with the figures "445." If we as-
sumed that the train was going at a slower speed-15 miles 
per hour, as testified to by some of the members of the train 
crew-it would travel 22 feet per second and in the 15 sec-
onds it took the automobile to go the 400 feet to the cross-
ing, the train would travel only 330 feet, in which event 
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the train would be at Engineer's Station 446 when the 
automobile came out of the ravine to the high point marked 
"El. 98.2." · 
We must keep in mind one other matter which is shown 
by the map. The majority of the testimony in evidence was 
to the effect that after paralleling the track and then turn-
ing towards the crossing, the roadway approached the track 
nearly at right angles for approximately 75 feet. Before 
this turn to head -directly toward the track the testimony of 
most of the witnesses stated that the roadway paralleled 
the track for about 300 feet. The measurements on the 
map show that this distance wherein the road parallels the 
track is somewhat less than 300 feet, but nevertheless from 
the time an automobile would top the rise as it came out 
! of the ravine at the point on the map marked "El. 98.2," 
the automobile would still have approximately 100 feet to 
travel, starting in a downhill direction with the track di-
rectly in view, before the automobile turned to the south-
east to parallel the track. During this time and while the 
automobile was traveling this 100 feet, the physical facts 
and circumstances shown by the speeds and distances con-
I elusively demonstrate that the engine and at least some of 
the front cars of the train had to be within view along the 
track, if not directly in front of the plaintiff and Mrs. Jones 
as they approached over this 100 feet almost at right angles 
to the track. Measurements along the roadway running 
back from the crossing do show that it is approximately 75 
1 feet from the crossing to the bend in the road, although the 
bend is not sharp and it is hard to tell where the apex of 
the curve is. By figuring approximately 75 feet from the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
crossing to the bend in the roadway, the distance to the 
northwest which the roadway then parallels the track 
would be slightly in excess of 250 feet. Thus from the track 
going back northerly to the bend where the roadway turns 
toward the ravine after paralleling the track (to the 
point where the figures "El. 97.1" appear on the roadway) 
would be a distance of somewhere in the neighborhood of 
325 to 350 feet. If the automobile traveled the last 350 feet 
to the crossing at 18 miles per hour or 26.4 feet to the 
second, it would take the automobile approximately 13 sec-
onds to travel this distance of 350 feet. Assuming the train 
to have been going at the fastest speed testifed to or 20 
miles per hour, which would be 29.3 feet per second, in this 
13 seconds the train would go approximately 381 feet, in 
which event at the time the automobile turned to the south-
east to parallel the track the train would have been 381 
feet down the track or slightly beyond the Engineer's Sta-
tion marked 446. If the speed of the train was lower than 
the 20 miles per hour, then the train would have been much 
closer to the crossing and again directly in head of the 
automobile before it made the turn. 
If we consider the testimony of the members of the 
train crew, which is not in any way disputed by plaintiff 
or any of her witnesses, that the automobile at all times 
was traveling at a faster rate of speed than the train, then 
at the time the automobile made the turn to the southeast 
to parallel the track at the point marked "El. 97.1," the 
train was somewhere between the station marked along 
the track with the figures 446 and the crossing. 
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Whichever view of the speeds and distances might be 
taken as herein referred to, there can be no possible escape 
from the conclusion that had plaintiff looked as she said 
she did when they came to the top of the rise out of the 
ravine, she could not possibly have avoided seeing the ap-
proaching train. 
It does not assist counsel to repeat or attempt to em-
phasize the claim of Sheriff Keate that anyone approach-
ing in an automobile as the plaintiff and Mrs. Jones were 
would have to look straight up or that it was hard to see. 
because the track was higher than the roadway, because 
it will be seen that from the time the automobile came to 
the top out of the ravine to the point marked "El. 98.2," and 
from that point on to the crossing, there was a distance of 
at least 75 feet between the track and the roadway and no 
more than three feet difference in elevation at any time 
until after the automobile had turned southeast to parallel 
the track, at which time the diffe~ence in elevation would 
vary from three feet to less than five feet. An elevation of 
five feet at a distance in excess of 75 feet away does not 
require anyone to crane his neck or even turn it to look 
up, and rather than hindering a view that anyone would 
have, would only tend to silhouette any object that might 
be moving along the track in the vicinity. 
Counsel try to emphasize the fact that plaintiff and 
her driver would have had to look backwards. They would 
not have had to look backwards at any time while travel-
ing the 100 feet from the point marked "El. 98.2" to the 
bend in the road, and from the point where the road turned 
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to parallel the track, the speeds and distances when con-
sidered with the fact that the collision occurred at the cross-
ing compel the view that the train could not have.been very 
many feet behind the car and at least was 75 feet away 
from it, so that the angle of looking back, if any necessity 
existed at all to look back, would not have been severe 
even at any time while the automobile was traveling the 
parallel roadway toward the crossing. 
There is one other fact that counsel for appellant have 
overlooked in their statement of facts, and that is that at 
the time the automobile came up to the crossing the train 
was still approximately 50 feet away (R. 98, 235-236). If 
the automobile had not stopped on the crossing, it would 
have negotiated the crossing without trouble. The driver 
of the automobile admitted that' she never looked at all, 
stating as follows: "I don't know why my husband allows 
me to drive. I never even looked" (R. 162). And again, "I 
never even looked to see if a train was coming" (R. 201). 
As the automobile approached the crossing the speed at 
which it was going was such that it could easily have 
stopped and the members of the train crew assumed that 
it would stop before going across the track (R. 196, 214, 
216, 220) unless the driver concluded that the automobile· 
could make the crossing ahead of the train (R. 194, 205, 
217), and the autom~bile, at the speed at which it con· 
tinued as it came near the crossing, would have cleared the 
crossing except for the fact that it stopped on the track, 
at which time it was too late for the engine crew to do any-
thing. 
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The driver of plaintiff's car never did look and never 
did see the train, and that, coupled with plaintiff's failure, 
to see what was there to be seen when she looked, or her 
failure to look at all caused the accident, because it was 
plaintiff's failure to see what she should have seen until 
at the last moment and then her exclamation, "Oh, my God," 
which caused the driver of the car to stop on the track 
when the train was 50 feet away. If the plaintiff had seen 
the train earlier and if she and her driver had concluded, 
as they would have been justified in concluding, that they 
could have made the crossing, plaintiff would not have so 
exclaimed and the car would not have stopped on the track. 
If neither of them had ever seen the train but if plaintiff 
had not so screamed upon her late view of the train, the 
car in . which she was riding would have passed over the 
crossing safely. 
Counsel for appellant at page 7 of their statement of 
facts state with respect to the engineer: "He perhaps could 
have seen to the left, but he was not looking." Counsel can-
not assume any such fact and are in error in so stating be-
cause the type of engine involved in the case was one with 
the diesel engine framework out in head of the cab, and 
there was no way for the engineer to look to the left except 
if he looked exactly at right angles across through the cab 
and out of the fireman's window. 
Counsel also refer on page 9 of their statement of facts 
to the speed of the train and the distance within which 
they contend it could have been stopped, and assert that 
the train could have stopped within 120 feet, because as 
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a matter of fact it was stopped within 120 feet after the 
brakes were actually applied. Counsel overlook the fact, 
however, that the only testimony in the record aside from 
the fact that it took 120 feet after the brakes were applied 
to bring the train to a stop is that it takes some little time 
for the air to equalize back through the air lines to apply· 
the brakes. The only witness who testified with respect 
to this stated that it would take approximately seven sec-
onds for the air to equalize back through the air lines (R. 
199) . The train had not yet reached the crossing when the 
fireman yelled to the engineer, and yet the train went 
three car lengths, or approximately 120 feet south of the 
crossing. Therefore, there is no evidence from which plain-
tiff or anyone else could conclude anything other than that 
it would take approximately 120 feet to stop after the 
brakes actually took effect and about seven seconds for 
the air to equalize back through the brake lines before the 
brakes would take effect. 
Toward the bottom of page 9 counsel state: "As the 
car came out of the ravine it was ahead of the train. Mrs. 
Hudson so testified and one of the train crew corroborated 
her * * *." Mrs. Hudson never so testified because she 
never saw the train. She states that she loked as she came 
out of the ravine but never saw the train, so she GOuld not 
say where it was. If Mrs. Hudson had seen the train and 
been able to say where it was, then she would have been 
guilty of contributory negligence without question. The 
member of the train crew who corroborated, as referred to 
by counsel, was the witness Mr. Oliver, who stated that 
as the car came up out of the ravine it was some little dis-
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tance ahead of the train. However, after the car came 
out of the ravine, there was a distance of approximately 
100 feet which it had to travel. Also we should remember 
that if the members of the train crew could see the car as 
it came out of the ravine then the train was not to the 
north back of any claimed hill but out in plain view where 
plaintiff would have seen it had she looked. 
The plaintiff did say, "The train was coming back of 
us," but she claims never to have seen it until just before 
it struck, when she exclaimed, "Oh, my God." But all of 
the testimony of those who were able to make any compari-
son between the train and the automobile is to the effect 
that the automobile was traveling faster than the train. 
Therefore, the automobile and the train had to be some-
where in the near vicinity of each other as the automobile 
turned on the roadway paralleling the track, and as the 
automobile was traveling a little faster than the train, it 
gained somewhat on the train so that as it turned on the 
75 feet of the roadway to go over the track, it reached 
the track at a time when the train was still about 50 feet 
from the crossing. At that time, upon the exclamation of 
the plaintiff when she saw the train and screamed, "Oh, 
my God," the driver slammed on the brakes and stopped 
the car directly on the track in front of the train. 
As stated by counsel, the train crew did observe the 
car in its approach to the crossing, but there was nothing 
in the movement of the automobile that would indicate to the 
members of the train crew that there was any hazard, and 
as a matter of fact, those who had kept watch on the car 
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concluded that it would pass over the crossing safely until 1 
at the last moment when the car stopped directly on the 
track in front of the train. 
Counsel state at the conclusion of their statement of 
facts that the extent and nature of Mrs. Hudson's injuries 
are not material here. That is true except it should be pointed 
out that the nature of the injuries in and of itself will in-
dicate that the train could not have been going at a very 
high rate of speed. The injuries to the plaintiff were not 
very serious in and of themselves. The main damages of 
which plaintiff now complains arises as a result of an em-
bolism or phlebothrombosis which occurred some 10 days 
after the accident (Exhibit 9). The actual injury was not 
ext~nsive, and Mrs. Jones, the driver of the car, stateq that 
she was "glad the train was not going fast" (R. 222). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH 
A JURY COULD HAVE DETERMINED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT OR 
THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF 
THE DEFENDANT WAS IN ANY WAY A 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
(Appellant's Point I and Point II) 
The only negligence claimed by plaintiff is that the 
train crew failed to give adequate warning of its approach. 
The only testimony offered by plaintiff tending to show the 
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defendant failed to give the required crossing signal and 
failed to ring the bell on the train as the train approached 
the crossing is the testimony of the plaintiff herself. In 
response to questions by her counsel she stated she heard 
no whistle and heard no bell as she proceeded toward the 
crossing (R. 79). Again, she states nothing distracted her 
attention and no whistle was blown (R. 85). On cross-
examination she repeated this testimony, stating in response 
to a question: "Absolutely there was no whistle of any kind" 
(R. 107). She further stated on cross-examination that she 
wasn't conscious of the nearby railroad track (R. 104), that 
she was talking casually to the driver of the car (R. 93), 
and that she and the driver were talking about hearing the 
"click" of the automobile transmission when 20 miles per 
hour speed was reached. For 300 feet the road paralleled the 
track and was 75 feet therefrom. She testified the windows 
of the automobile were down. 
In behalf of the railroad the engineer on the train in 
question testified he sounded the regular crossing whistle-
two longs, a short and a long-and that the automatic bell 
was turned on about two miles from the crossing and was 
left on after the accident (R. 158-159) ; that the first blast 
of the whistle was at a point approximately one-fourth mile 
from the crossing (R. 174). On cross-examination the en-
gineer admitted he had no definite recollection qf blowing 
the whistle on this occasion but based his testimony with 
respect to the whistle upon his usual practice in that re-
gard. The fireman testified the engineer blew the whistle 
for the crossing (R. 192) ; that the first blast was about 
one-fourth mile from the crossing (R. 208-210) ; that the 
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bell was ringing (R. 193, 210, 215). The brakeman testified 
the whistle was blown and the bell was ringing (R. 220), and 
the whistle was still blowing at the time of impact (R. 
227) . The swing brakeman testified the first he noticed the 
whistle was when the train went into emergency (R. 240, 
244). The conductor testified he heard the whistle at the 
time the train went into emergency ; that the emergency 
application brought the whistle to his attention (R. 248); 
that he heard the whistle blowing before the emergency 
application, but he paid no particular attention to it (R. 
250, 252) . The conductor further testified he didn't hear 
the bell until after the train had stopped, but the noise of 
the train drowns the sound of the bell in the caboose where 
he was riding ( R. 252) . Mr. Jackson, brakeman riding in 
the caboose, testified he heard the engineer whistle for the 
grade crossing ( R. 254) . He also testified he didn't 
hear the bell until after the train stopped because of the 
noise in the caboose ( R. 258) . 
Against plaintiff's testimony that no whistle was blown 
and no bell sounded, then, there is the testimony of six 
crew members that the whistle was blown, one of the six 
testifying, however, that he first heard the signal at the 
time of the emergency application and if a person were pay-
ing attention he would hear the whistle from his position in 
the cupola of the caboose; and one other, the engineer, 
testifying that he based his positive statement upon his 
custom and habit of whistling at all crossings; and we have 
the testimony of three members of the crew that the bell 
was ringing as the train approached the crossing, and the 
other three members of the crew were in a position where 
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they could not hear if the bell was ringing. In the face of this 
positive testimony, the negative evidence as to _the failure 
to give warnings is without probative force. 
We preface our argument concerning this negative 
testimony with our observation that the law applicable to 
this point is not and cannot be definitely settled,. in this 
jurisdiction or elsewhere. The reports abound with cases 
in point, and the subject has been exhaustively treated by 
our own Supreme Court. Because no two items of negative 
testimony are alike and because so many factors must be 
-considered in analyzing testimony, no accurate rules can 
be formulated to determine what evidence is negative and 
what negative evidence has probative value. It is submitted, 
·however, that if the evidence in the case is tested by the 
formulae announced in the Utah cases, it will be found lack-
ing in probative force. 
One of the first Utah cases we find in point Is 
Russell v. Watkins, 49 Utah 598, 164 P. 867. Plaintiff was 
riding a motorcyele toward Ogden, and he approached a 
horse and wagon travelin~ in the opposite direction. Defend-
ant was driving an automobile behind the wagon, and he 
turned out to pass the wagon and collided head-on with the 
motorcycle. Plaintiff testified defendant failed to blow his 
horn, and his testimony was corroborated by the driver of 
the wagon. The court said this : 
~·· "As to the first proposition, that of the defend-
ant failing to signal his approach, before the accident, 
we have searched the record in vain for any tangible 
evidence to sustain plaintiff's contention. The direct 
and positive testimony of the defendant himself con-
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cerning his nearing-the place of the accident, namely, 
'I came up behind a man that had a wagon and two 1 
horses at the back, and I honked my horn before I en. 
deavored to turn out; it was about, I should think, 40 
to 50 feet before I tried to turn out; I couldn't get his 
attention, however' -stands in the record to our 
minds, wholly uncontradicted. True, some of the 
witnesses testifying for plaintiff, particularly the 
plaintiff and the witness Bryson, say that they 'did 
not hear' a warning. When we take into considera-
tion that the plaintiff, according to his own testi-
mony, was at the time without thought and wholly 
unaware of the approach of defendant's automobile, 
that he was seated on a motorcycle moving at the 
rate of 15 or 20 miles an hour, that his view of the 
traveled road was obscured by Bryson's approaching 
wagon and horses, and of necessity had to cross im-
mediately to the east side <?f the highway for safety 
and in passing the Bryson vehicle, and that the wit-
ness Bryson was, at the same time, apprehensively 
riveting his attention on the motorcycle approaching 
him, on account of his own safety, and through fear 
of the horse he was driving making him. trouble, we 
may well believe these witnesses 'did not hear' the 
horn sounded by the defendant on his approach. 
"The weight of negative testimony of witnesses, 
as to the giving of signals, ordinarily is for the jury 
to determine; but, when physical conditions and the 
attending circumstances are such as to render it 
highly improbable that they could hear, we think the 
rule should be and is otherwise. Jordan v. Osborne, 
147 Wis. 623, 133 N. W. 32; Menard v. Boston, etc., 
R. R., 150 Mass. 386, 23 N. E. 214. In the Massa-
chusetts case, last above cited, the court, in speaking 
of the weight of this class of testimony, says: 
"'A witness may be in any conceivable attitude 
of attention or inattention,· which will give his evi-
dence value, or leave it with little or no weight.' " 
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In Je·nsen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 59 Utah 367, 
__ : 204 P. 101, one witness testified he heard no bell but was 
-.. : 
c:: giving his attention to another train nearby. The train crew 
testified the bell was rung. The court held that the nega-
:!: ~ tive testimony had no probative value, stating: 
"This is not a case in which the witness claims to 
have been listening for signals and failed to hear 
them. The witness in this case was not consciously 
listening at all. His attention was directed in another 
direction, and his mind was engrossed in other mat-
ters. * * *" 
There is no claim in the instant case that Mrs. Hudson 
was listening for signals. The only possible inference to be 
drawn from the testimony was that she not only was not 
Jr listening for signals, but that her attention was diverted to 
her conversation with Mrs. Jones and to listening for the 
"click" of the automobile transmission. 
ClaTk et al. v. Union Pac. R. Co. et al., 70 Utah 29, 257 
P. 1050, contains a thorough review of the law on the point, 
and in this case the evidence as to failure to give warning 
was held sufficient to create a controversy. At the time of 
the accident an extremely heavy fog obscured the railroad 
crossing. Two school girls walked along the' road close to 
the crossing. They were familiar with the crossing and 
with the train schedule. They were late for school, and they 
particularly listened for the train in order to learn just 
how late they were. They testified they heard no whistle 
or bell. Two men were driving a team toward the crossing, 
and because the fog made it impossible for them to see the 
crossing, they were particularly alert for the sound of the 
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train. Both of these men testified they heard no whistle or 
bell. Two other men were feeding cattle near the crossing. 
One of the two was watching and listening for the train. 
Both testified they heard no whistle or bell. The court held, 
with one judge dissenting, that this evidence was of pro-
bative value and created a jury question as to failure to give 
warning. We quote from that opinion: 
"* * * As to the question of signals it is the 
contention of the respondent that there was direct 
and positive evidence given that the whistle was 
sounded and the bell rung, and that the testimony 
of witnesses was merely of a negative character; that 
they did not hear either the sounding of the whistle 
or the ringing of the bell; and that in such case such 
negative testimony did not raise any conflict in the 
evidence. In support of that Jensen v. 0. S. L. R. R. 
Co., 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101; Quinley v. Spring-
field Traction Co., 180 Mo. App. 287, 165 S. W. 346; 
Oliver v. U. P. R. R. Co., 105 Neb. 243,, 179 N .W. 
1017; Bannister v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 199 Iowa, 657, 
202 N. W. 766; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Myrick 
(Fla.) 109 So. 193, and other cases, are cited. These 
cases in effect hold that a mere negation on the part 
of a witness that he did not hear the bell rung or the 
whistle sounded on an engine approaching a crossing 
will not sustain a finding by a jury that such signals 
were not given, when it is shown that the witness 
was not paying attention to the occurrence, and does 
not know whether the whistle was or was not sounded 
or the bell rung, and only testified that he did not 
hear the warning, and that such testimony does not 
contradict positive and direct testimony of a witness 
or witnesses that the whistle was sounded and the 
bell rung. But a reading of the cases and of other 
cases on the subject shows that it is not the fact of 
negative testimony, but the character of the negative 
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testimony, which is regarded as not sufficient to sup-
port a verdict that signals were not given, or to raise 
a conflict with testimony that the bell was rung and 
whistle blown. It is clear that, where one witness testi-
fies that the whistle was sounded and the bell rung, 
and another witness of equal opportunity to know the 
fact testifies that he was listening to see whether the 
whistle did or did not sound and the bell ring, and 
that the whistle did not sound nor the bell ring, posi-
tive testimony is met by positive testimony; and, if 
the witnesses are of equal credibility, the testimony of 
the one is entitled to as much weight as the other. 
Even where a witness testifies that he was listening 
for signals, and was in position to hear the signals 
had they been given, and that, if they had been given, 
he would have heard them, but that he did not hear 
any signals given, some courts treat that kind of 
evidence not as negative but as positive testimony. 
Other courts treat it as negative testimony, but in 
such case not to be disregarded, but to be considered 
of sufficient probative value to justify a finding 
that signals were not given, and to raise a conflict 
in the evidence where there was positive testimony 
that the bell was rung and the whistle blown. Wheth-
er the testimony of a witness, who is shown to have 
been in position to hear the signals had they been 
given, that he was listening for them, and would have 
heard them had they been given, but heard no signals, 
be regarded as positive or negative in character, 
still we think the weight of judicial authority shows 
that such testimony is of such probative value as to 
justify a jury in giving as much, or even greater, 
weight to it than to positive testimony of witnesses 
that the signals were given, if the witnesses are of 
equal credibility. Though a witness was not specially 
listening for signals, or giving special attention to 
the occurrence, yet, if his attention was not en-
grossed or diverted to other things, and it being 
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made to appear that he was in position to hear, and 
in all likelihood would have heard, them, had they 
been given, his testimony that he heard none is still 
of probative value, and is not to be disregarded, 
though its weight be not regarded as great as the 
testimony of a witness who testified that he was 
specially watching and listening for signals, and 
heard none, or of a witness that they were or were 
not given. * * *" 
The subject was next treated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Anderson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 76 Utah 324,289 
P. 146. In this case two witnesses were working on a steam 
engine just six feet from the railroad track at the scene of 
the accident. One of the two testified he had no re-
membrance of hearing the bell. The other testified he didn't 
hear the bell or whistle. The court said: 
"* * * Upon this evidence the plaintiff was 
not entitled to go to the jury on such questions. The 
testimony of the witness which is merely to the ef-
fect that he did not hear a whistle blown or a bell 
rung is not sufficient to overcome positive and direct 
testimony that the whistle was sounded and the bell 
rung. To entitle negative testimony such as that of 
Redden and Thompson affecting the ringing of the 
bell and the blowing of the whistle on the occasion 
in question to any probative value, it must be made 
to appear that they were paying some attention to 
what actually occurred and that they were in a 
position where they could and did observe what was 
done or what was not done. Clark v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company (Utah) 257 Pac. 1050 and cases 
there cited." 
From these Utah cases, then, we learn that when there 
is positive testimony as to the giving of a warning, before 
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negative testimony that no warning was given raises a 
conflict with respect thereto, it must appear that the person 
so testifying was in a position to hear and that he was pay-
ing some attention. 
Since the subject has been thoroughly treated by the 
Utah Court, it will serve little purpose to cite other author-
ity. Examination of cases from other jurisdictions shows, 
however, that the Utah decisions are in accord with the 
majority. We invite the court's attention to the extensive 
annotation in 162 A. L. R. at page 9. For later cases on the 
subject see: 
Norfolk & fV. Ry. Co. v. Eley, (Va.) 162 S. E. 3. 
Poland v. City of Seattle, (Wash.) 93 P. 2d 379. 
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gaede, 110 F. 2d. 931. 
Flagg v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 143 F. 
2d 90. 
Canion v. Southern Pacific Co., (Ariz.) 80 P. 2d 
397. 
Powell et al. v. Gary, (Fla.) 200 So. 854. 
Robertson v. New York Central Ry. Co., (Ill.) 
58 N. E. 2d 527. 
State, for Use of Emerson v. Poe, (Md.) 190 
A. 231. 
Allison v. Boston & M. R., (N. H.) 190 A. 127. 
Ealy et ux. v. New York Central Ry. Co., (Pa.) 
5 A. 2d 110. 
Lehigh Valley Ry. Co.v. Mamgan, 2·78 F. 85. 
In 44 Am. Jur., Railroads, Sec. 629, it is stated: 
"While negative testimony that the witness did 
not hear the bell or whistle of the train as he ap-
proached the crossing is admissible, such evidence 
ranges through all degrees of credibility. Testimony 
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of a witness that he did not hear the signal, without 
proof that the witness was listening and was in a 
position to hear, carries little or no weight, especially 
in the face of positive and direct evidence to the con-
trary. In the face of positive evidence that signals 
were sounded, testimony of a witness that he did 
not hear any signal is entitled to no weight and does 
not create a conflict of evidence sufficient to go to 
the jury. Especially is this true where it appeared 
that witnesses who testified that they did not hear 
the signals were not in a situation to hear, or were 
not noticing for the purpose of hearing such signals. 
* * *" 
The evidence fails to show that Mrs. Hudson was at-
tentive and was listening for the approaching train. She 
was not conscious of the nearby railroad track. Her attention 
was diverted elsewhere. It is not shown that the brakeman 
was attentive to the whistle until the emergency applica-
tion attracted his attention. As testified to by the conductor 
and other crew members, workmen in the caboose pay little 
or no attention to crossing whistles. 
"If the witness had been accustomed to hear 
such signals frequently so that their impression would 
be deadened by habit, his testimony that he did not 
hear them would have no weight as against trust-
worthy affirmative evidence that the signals were 
given, unless the witness was able to testify to some 
circumstance showing that his attention was specially 
directed to the subject on the occasion in question." 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stepp et al., 164 F. 785. 
The evidence as to defendant's failure to give adequate 
warning fails to meet the objective tests established by the 
Utah Court and is therefore without probative force. There 
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was no evidence upon which the jury could properly have 
found that the defendant was negligent. 
There are cases in which courts have held that the form 
of a witness' answer might determine whether his testimony 
is of a negative or positive character. Such courts would 
apparently treat Mrs. Hudson's testimony that she heard 
no whistle as a negative statement but 4er testimony that 
"Absolutely there was no whistle of any kind" as a positive 
statement entitled to probative value. The defendant sub-
mits that there is no difference in substance between the 
two forms of testimony. When a witness testifies that she 
heard no whistle, in substance she is stating that as far 
as she knows there absolutely was no whistle sounded. It 
is the substance of the testimony that is important in the 
trial of an action; a witness should not be permitted to 
alter the legal effect of his testimony by changing the form 
of his answer. If it be shown that a witness was in a posi-
tion where he probably would not hear a whistle, his state-
ment that there was no whistle sounded should bear no 
more weight than his statement that he heard no whistle. 
Since Mrs. Hudson testified that her attention was directed 
to listening for the "click" of the transmission, and she was 
not aware of the approaching train nor alert to her proximity 
to the crossing, she was hardly in a position at the trial to 
testify that there "Absolutely was no whistle of any kind." 
As stated by the Utah Court in Anderson v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., supra, the important element is that, "It must be made 
to appear that they were paying some attention to what 
actually occurred and that they were in a position where they 
could and did observe what was done or what was not done." 
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While as a matter of legal principle we oppose a rule 
which over-emphasizes the importance of the form of testi-
mony, still in this case the question of which rule is the 
proper one is not of great materiality. As plaintiff stated 
in her brief, the Utah statute must govern in this case, and 
as plaintiff points out, the Utah statute, Section 77-0-14, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, requires the ringing of a bell, 
or in the alternative, the blowing of a whistle. Cases from 
almost every jurisdiction having a statute similar to the 
one in question have held that both the ringing of the bell 
and the blowing of the whistle are not required, either being 
sufficient. Thus even if we concede that plaintiff's testimony 
regarding absence of a whistle is positive evidence, this 
would not be true of her testimony regarding the ringing of 
the bell. Now here in her testimony did the plaintiff attempt 
to state definitely that a bell was not rung. Even in those 
jurisdictions which might hold that plaintiff's testimony that 
no whistle was sounded was of some probative value because 
of th~ form thereof, her testimony that she heard no bell must 
still be held to be negative testimony only and not of suf-
ficient probative force to overcome the positive testimony 
on the part of the members of the train crew that the bell 
was ringing and that they had to turn it off even after the 
accident. We repeat that the law does not require both 
the ringing of the bell and the blowing of the whistle, and 
even though the plaintiff might be considered as having 
positively testified that the whistle was not blown, that 
cannot be said of any of her testimony with respect to the 
ringing of the bell, and in any view of the testimony plaintiff 
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has failed to prove both that the whistle was not blown and 
the bell was not rung. It was incumbent upon her to prove 
not only that there was no whistle blown but also, under the 
alternative statute, that the bell was not ringing. Her nega-
tive testimony with respect to the bell, in all events, is in-
sufficient to meet the requirements and must be fatal to 
her cause. 
Assuming an issue was raised as to failure to give ade-
quate warning, it is not shown by plaintiff that such failure 
was the proximate cause of the accident. It is not shown that 
the driver of the car was unaware of the approaching train. 
While a jury could find from the evidence that the automo-
bile was a little distance ahead of the train when the automo-
bile came out of the ravine, the automobile still had approx-
imately 100 feet to travel coming toward the track before 
turning parallel to the track, during which time the train 
may have passed the point directly ahead of the car because 
the evidence shows that the automobile was behind the train 
going faster than the train, overtaking it, and that it got 
ahead of the train as it passed along the parallel strip and 
thus beat the train to the crossing. The uncontradicted evi-
dence is that the automobile stopped on the tracks, that there 
was time for it to clear the tracks had it not stopped. The 
burden of proof was on the plaintiff, and as one of the 
elements of her cause of action she had the burden of prov-
ing that Mrs. Jones entered upon the railroad tracks and the 
accident happened as a direct and proximate result of some 
negligence on the part of the defendant. Mere speculation 
cannot be substituted for proof of this essential elemen~. 
We have the testimony of the plaintiff that she did not see 
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the train until the automobile was on the crossing. She did 
not have control of the automobile, however. We do not 
know what the driver of the car saw. For all that appears 
she was available to testify at the trial, and the burden was 
on the plaintiff, if she wished to prevail, to secure her 
testimony that she was unaware of the train if that was the 
fact. To permit the jury to find that she was not aware of 
the train is to permit the founding of a verdict upon mere 
speculation, for the undisputed evidence shows that she 
could have negotiated the crossing without mishap 
had she not stopped on the track. She may have seen the 
train and concluded she could cross ahead of it until stopped 
by the exclamation of plaintiff. From the evidence before 
the court it was just as reasonable to tnfer that Mrs. Jones 
saw the train and tried to beat it over the crossing as to 
infer that she never saw it at all. 
"When proofs are such that two or more reason-
able inferences may be drawn from the known facts 
in respect to negligence, or that the negligence was 
proximately the cause of an injury, they present no 
more than a choice of probabilities, and the plaintiff 
must fail, since the burden of proof is on him." 
Somogyi v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 101 F. 
2d 480. 
In 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Sec. 285, it is stated: 
"In showing that the negligence charged was 
the proximate cause of the injury, it is not enough 
for the plaintiff to prove that the negligence might 
perhaps have caused the injury. If, for example, the 
injury complained of might well have resulted from 
any one of many causes, it is incumbent upon the 
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plaintiff to produce evidence which will exclude the 
operation of these causes for which defendant is un-
der no legal obligation. If the cause of the injury to 
the plaintiff may be as reasonably attributed to an 
act for which the defendant is not liable as to one 
for which he is liable, the plaintiff has not sustained 
the burden of fastening tortious conduct upon the 
defendant. * * *" 
And in 38 Am. J ur., Negligence, Sec. 335: 
"* * * the evidence must not leave the causal 
connection a matter of conjecture; it must be some-
thing more than consistent with plaintiff's theory 
as to how the accident occurred. Where the proof of 
causal connection is equally balanced, or the facts 
are as consistent with one theory as with another, 
plaintiff has not met the burden the law casts upon 
him." 
In the case of Rogers et al. v. Rio Grande Western Ry. 
Co., 32 Utah 367, 90 P. 1075, the court said: 
"It may be conceded that the failure to comply 
with the statute with regard to warning signals 
generally constitutes negligence per se, as was held 
by this court in Smith v. Min. & S. S. Co. (Utah) 88 
Pac. 683, but proof of negligence without more, 
however, is not enough. In addition to this the party 
upon whom rests the burden of proof must show by 
some competent evidence that the negligence proved 
was the proximate cause of the injury complained of, 
or, where there is more than one cause, that it at 
least was one of the causes." 
We do not know why the plaintiff, in discharge of her 
burden of proof, failed to call Mrs. Jones to testify as to this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
important link in her cause of action. Mrs. Jones alone knew 
the truth as to this indispensable matter. We do not know 
why the plaintiff failed to call Mrs. Jones, but we are en-
titled to presume the reason she did not was that Mrs. Jones' 
testimony would be adverse to her. 
In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 187, it is stated: 
"It is well settled that if a party fails to pro-
duce the testimony of an available witness of a 
material issue in the cause, it may be inferred that 
his testimony, if presented, would be adverse to the 
party who fails to call the witness." 
The inference as to proximate cause to be drawn from 
the evidence is at least equally consistent with non-liability 
as with liability. The presumption as to the testimony of 
the one person who knows which inference is the proper one 
is against the plaintiff. The jury could not be permitted to 
conjecture as to the truth of one inference over another 
equally plausible. To permit such conjecture in the face of 
a contrary presumption would be highly improper. 
In any event, plaintiff does not deny that the car stop-
ped on the track. The testimony of the fireman and of Brake-
man Oliver that it did stop is not disputed. Had the auto-
mobile not stopped there would have been no collision. IT 
WAS THE STOPPING ON THE TRACK AND NOT A 
FAILURE TO GIVE WARNING THAT WAS THE 
DIRECT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE AC-
CIDENT. 
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Hale, (Ala.) 133 So. 8, the plain-
tiff drove upon defendant's tracks without looking, and 
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sought to excuse his contributory negligence on the ground 
that his automobile stalled on the track and but for this stall-
ing he would have safely negotiated the crossing. The court 
said in its opinion : 
"This leads to the conclusion that the proximate 
cause of the accident was not the failure on plaintiff's 
part to stop, look and listen as required by law, but 
the choking of the engine of his automobile upon 
the track. But, as said by the Florida Court in Louis-
ville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Harrison, 78 Fla. 381, 
83 So. 89, a case here very much in point, 'with that 
the railroad had nothing to do and in no way con-
tributed to it * * * If the engine of the auto-
mobile had not choked down when it got on the track, 
the accident would not have occurred. This was not 
a contingency that the railroad employees were called 
upon to anticipate.'" 
See also Vernon v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (La.) 97 So. 
493, wherein the court says: 
"The flagman testifies (and the physical fact 
seems to corroborate him) that the automobile would 
have cleared the crossing but for the fact that it 
stopped upon the middle of the track in front of 
the oncoming train; which latter fact is also shown 
by testimony of many other witnesses, although the 
record is barren of any evidence tending to show 
whether this was the result of the automobile engine 
'going dead' or of the driver becoming panic stricken. 
At any rate it is certain that the sudden stopping 
of the automobile upon the track was the direct and 
only cause of the accident, which then became in-
evitable." 
The defendant submits that there was no evidence from 
which the jury could have properly found that the collision 
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was proximately caused by any negligence on the part of the 
defendant. 
Plaintiff's counsel in their argument on page 14 state: 
"The car had done nothing whatever to suggest that the 
driver had seen the train." While that may be true, the 
converse is also true-the car had done nothing and there 
was nothing in the manner of operation or movements of 
the car to indicate that the driver had not seen the train. 
Firemen, as well as other members of the train crews, 
observe cars approaching crossings every day and many 
·times a day. That does not mean that every time a member 
of an engine crew sees a car approaching a crossing he must 
bring the train to a stop to let the automobile go by. The 
law has repeatedly stated that members of a train crew 
are entitled to assume that the driver or other occupants of 
an approaching car will see the train and will stop to let 
it go by, and members of a train crew are entitled to so as-
sume until something in either the movements of the car or 
what they may see of its occupants will indicate to a reason-
able man something to the contrary. There was nothing in 
the evidence here to so indicate until the time when members 
of the train crew concluded that the automobile was not 
going to stop but that it was going to proceed over the cross-
ing, at which time the automobile had ample time to pass 
over the crossing ahead of the train, and the evidence shows 
that it would have done so except for the fact that the auto-
mobile stopped on the tracks at a time when the train was 
approximately 50 feet distant therefrom. 
CoJinsel state again on page 14: "With the crew know-
ing that the train anq the car were thus approaching a 
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crossing, the cr~w had a common law duty either to adjust 
the speed of the train to avoid an accide~t or to warn the 
car of its approach." Counsel cite no law for this point and 
we submit that their statement is contrary to law. The law 
has always been and still is to the effect that an automobile 
approaching a railroad crossing has the duty to stop and let 
a train go by rather than for the train to stop and let the 
automobile go by. But even should we admit the statement 
of counsel, the evidence is undisputed that at the speed the 
train was going and the distance the train was from the 
crossing when the car came to the crossing, the car could 
have passed over the crossing and there would have been 
no necessity to slow down or adjust the speed of the train 
in order to allow the car to pass over the crossing. The rea-
son the car did not pass over the crossing is because instead 
of continuing at the speed it was going it stopped on the 
tracks right in head of the train, and according to plain-
tiff's testimony, was thus stopped soley as a result of her 
exclamation. When it was thus stopped there was nothing 
that the engineer or anyone else could have done. 
Counsel state again on page 17 of their brief that there 
was evidence that the train was only going 15 miles an hour, 
and "At this slow speed the train could have been slowed 
slightly to await the further action of the car." Counsel 
further state that the train could have been stopped in 120 
feet "had the engineer been aware of the approaching dang-, 
er." There was no approaching danger to be aware of. As the 
members of the train crew testified, they watched the auto-
mobile and there was nothing in the movements of the auto-
moble to indicate it would not stop until at the time it came 
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close enough to the crossing when at the speed it was going 
they concluded it was not going to stop but that it had plenty 
of time to pass over the crossing. Even at that time there 
was no peril to the car or its occupants and no approaching 
danger because had the automobile proceeded as it was 
going it would have cleared the crossing. Again referring 
to counsels' statement that the train could have been slowed 
to await the further action of the car, this argument might 
be availing if the engine had hit the car while the car was 
still moving, and there may have been some reasons to 
apprehend that at the speeds the two vehicles were moving 
they would meet at the crossing, but that was not the case. 
If the car had kept moving, it would not have been hit. The 
reason the car was hit was because it stopped on the tracks, 
and the train traveled the last 50 feet while the car was 
stopped on the tracks. At that point there was absolutely 
nothing that could be done by the engineer or any other 
member of the train crew because the only evidence in the 
record shows that it would take seven seconds for the air to 
equalize through the lines, and the train would go more 
than the remaining 50 feet before the brakes could take 
effect. 
We submit that the evidence shows that there was no 
negligence on the part of the train crew that was in any 
way a proximate cause of the accident. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. (Appellant's Point III) 
In commencing their argument upon their Point No. 
III, counsel for appellant state: "It is this third point upon 
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which we believe the trial court granted the directed ver-
dict." The appellant and her counsel have no basis what-
, soever in making such a statement and indulging in such 
an assumption, and we challenge counsel to produce any-
thing from the record that would give any support to such 
a statement. The court did not indicate from the bench or 
, otherwise which of the four points of plaintiff's motion he 
-:.. relied upon in granting the directed verdict. 
Regardless of that fact, we still feel that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Again under this argument counsel admit that there is 
- a conflict in the evidence, but state on page 24: "Mrs. 
Hudson testified that as they came out of the ravine she 
looked at the tracks and there was no train there. Her vision 
under the evidence, was blocked so that she could not see 
·- north along the track." Again we state that testimony which 
-- is contrary to demonstrated physical facts cannot be used 
·- as a basis for any jury finding, and even though the plain-
tiff testified that there was no train there, the train had to 
be there, and if she looked she was bound under the law to 
see it because the train was within view and to the south 
or southeast from any obstructions, otherwise the train 
·-· could not possibly have reached the crossing in time to be 
involved in the collision which resulted. It is true that one 
of the members of the train crew stated that the car was 
·:: ahead of the train when it came out of the ravine, but again 
we must remind court and counsel that at that point where 
the letters and figures "El. 98.2" appear on the roadway on 
the map, the automobile still had approximately 100 feet 
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to travel toward the track before it turned on the strip of 
roadway paralleling the track. Counsel refer to the case of 
Earle v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Corporation, 109 Utah 
111, 165 P. 2d 877, and then referring to plaintiff state on 
page 25 : "Certainly hert opportunity to see the train was 
not as good as that of the plaintiff in the Earle caf?e." Coun-
sel are in error because during the time that the automobile 
traveled the 100 feet toward the parallel strip after coming 
out of the ravine, it was traveling almost at right angles 
toward the track. The train was there and had to be there or 
it could not have been at the crossing for the collision. The 
plaintiff had a much better view than anyone in the Earle 
case had, and not only that, but different than what ap-
peared in the Earle case, the plaintiff herself testified that 
she actually did look. If she looked she was bound to see what 
was there to be seen. 
On page 26 of their brief counsel _for appellant refer 
to the fact that the car could have stopped almost to the 
point of impact at the speed that the car was going. That is 
true and can give the crew justification in assuming that the 
car would stop if it did not have time to go over the cross-
ing, and they thought it would stop until at the time it con-
tinued toward the track there was still time to go over the 
crossing and negotiate it in safety except for the fact that 
it stopped on the track directly in front of the train. 
On page 28 of their brief counsel refer to the case of 
Gate v. Fresno Traction Company, (Cal.) 2 P. 2d 364. The 
California court has gone further than the Utah courts on 
this question of contributory negligence, and we would like 
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'.::·to point out to the court that in the Gate case there was no 
. dispute between the parties but it was tacitly agreed and so 
stated in the opinion that both parties were in agreement 
·, upon the proposition that contributory negligence in that 
< case was a question for the jury. That is not agreed in this 
-- case and the Gate case cannot be authority here. 
__ In considering the question of plaintiff's contributory 
·~ negligence we call the court's attention to the following un-
~ ·.- disputed facts which appear in the record. Plaintiff was 
riding in the front seat of the automobile to the right of the 
._ driver (R. 53). She was awake and in full control of her 
-~ 
_ _ faculties. The car window on her side was down ( R. 78) . 
: After coming out of the ravine the car traveled toward the 
-- track for about 100 feet, during which time the train had to 
be somewhere near in full view or it would not have reached 
the crossing when it did. For approximately 300 feet the 
-:.: car paralleled the train which was on the track 75 feet from 
:.- the highway and on plaintiffs side (R. 55). Physical facts 
~- shown by speed and distances and the contour map show con-
::;: elusively that the train was to the south of and past any 
:::: obstructions when the automobile reached the top of the 
-. rise as it came out of the ravine-this at the exact time 
plaintiff said that she looked. There was no evidence of any 
obstructions at all in the vicinity of the crossing. The track 
·- was a little higher than the highway, but instead of a 
passenger having to look up high in the air, the angle of 
:.::- looking to see the train would be inconsequential and the 
•', 
difference in elevation would only tend to silhouette the train 
and make it stand out in bold relief (R. 56). Admittedly it 
~.~ would be more difficult for the driver to see during the time 
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the car was traveling the 300-foot parallel strip. Plaintiff, 
then, had a better view of the train than did the driver. The 
car proceeded slowly toward the crossing and could have 
been stopped had plaintiff warned the driver (R. 241). 
Plaintiff was familiar with the crossing, had passed over it 
a few minutes before, must have been aware of its presence, 
and knew the automobile was approaching the railroad track 
(R. 91). She observed the cross-arms giving warning of a 
railroad crossing (R. 91). Plaintiff and the driver were 
talking about the gear shift of the car right up to the time 
plaintiff looked up and saw the train almost upon them (R. 
93, 98). After the car turned to negotiate the crossing the 
train approached from plaintiff's side, and she had better 
opportunity than the driver to then see it (R. 98). Plaintiff 
herself had engaged the driver in a conversation about the 
gear shift and had thus diverted her attention (R. 98). 
We believe it can safely be said that the cases in Utah 
and elsewhere are unanimous in holding to the fundamental 
principle that a passenger in an automobile cannot ordinarily 
rely blindly upon the driver but must exercise reasonable 
care for his own safety. The above facts, as to the truth of 
which we believe there is no substantial doubt, show quite 
conclusively that the plaintiff exercised no care at all for 
her own safety, but ignored the imminent danger presented 
by the railroad crossing. Unless it can be said that an auto· 
mobile passenger under circumstances such as those in thi1 
case can discharge her duty to exercise reasonable care bl 
exercising no care at all, then it must be said that plaintif: 
was negligent. 
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No doubt there are instances when a passenger can in 
the exercise of reasonable care rely blindly on the driver. 
It is not negligence under all circumstances for a passenger 
to sleep. Generally, as is true o~ all negligence cases, the 
-- question of whether or not a passenger has conformed to 
the required standard of reasonable care is left to the jury. 
- As in the case of the driver, however, the law has defined 
-_ what conduct on the part of a passenger under certain cir-
--- cumstances measures up to the required standard, and when 
that question appears free from substantial doubt it is proper 
for the court to take the question from the jury. Defendant's 
position is that Mrs. Hudson's conduct shows, free from 
--- substantial doubt, that she was negligent. 
There is one thing which is conclusive as to plaintiff's 
negligence in this case. Whatever the law may be as to the 
requirement that a passenger such as plaintiff keep a look-
- out, we here have plaintiff's direct testimony that she did 
_ look. She says she looked as they came to the top out of the 
ravine. She says she looked but the train was not in sight. 
It had to be. Under the demonstrated physical facts and cir-
- cumstances as shown by the maps, and pictures, the measure-
ments and speeds as testified to, the train had to be in view 
for her to see when she came out of the ravine and when she 
- says she looked. A person cannot be heard to say that he 
looked but did not see anything which he must have seen 
- had he looked. The law says that when one looks he is bound 
to see what is there to be seen. 
In the case of Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
111 Utah 289, 177 P. 2d 903, this court stated: .... 
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"Plaintiff made no claim that she did not look 
down the track because it was off to the right rear. 
On the contrary she claims to have made this effort 
and to have looked. Such being the case, her duty to 
see was in no way diminished by the position of the 
train with reference to her. She was still bound to 
see what was there to be seen." 
An analysis of the Utah cases shows that the court 
has been clear and consistent in its treatment of this subject. 
The pivotal case among the Utah decisions is Lawrence v. 
Denver & R. G. R. Co., 52 Utah 414, 174 P. 817. In this case 
plaintiff sat in the front seat with the driver. The court 
determined the bell on the train was ringing. Plaintiff's 
vision was partly obstructed by a tree and telephone poles, 
but had he looked he could have seen the train. The court 
first states as follows: 
"* * * Furthermore, it is a well recognized 
rule that a steam railroad track in actual use is a 
constant warning of danger, and its presence is suf-
ficient, as a matter of law, to put a reasonably care-
ful person approaching it on notice of such danger. 
* * *" 
After then discussing the question of whether or not thE 
plaintiff and the driver were engaged in a joint enterprise~ 
the court concludes with this statement: 
"Assuming for the sake of argument, but noj 
conceding, that plaintiff was merely the guest oJ 
Bird, and was in no sense responsible for the manne1 
in which Bird operated and managed the automobilj 
while making the trip in question, it nevertheless wa: 
incumbent upon him to exercise ordinary care anj 
prudence by making diligent use of his senses o· 
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sight and hearing, by looking and listening for trains 
as the automobile approached the crossing, and to 
heed the warnings and signals of the approach of 
the train, and to suggest to Bird that they stop until 
the danger was over, and to protest if that was not 
done (Citing cases) . " 
During the same term of court as that in which the 
• Lawrence case was considered, our court had before it 
Montague v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 52 Utah 368, 174 P. 871. 
A cursory reading of this case may lead to the belief that 
:the court within one week reached diametri:cally opposite 
· results on similar cases. This is not true. In the Montague 
· case the plaintiff was riding in the front seat, but there 
· were seven other occupants in the car ; there was much 
:laughing and talking going on in the car; plaintiff was just 
17 years old; there was evidence that the train was visible 
. only at a point 90 feet from the crossing ; telephone poles 
and trees and a barn partly obscured vision; dust was created 
-by a car in front of that occupied by plaintiff; and the train 
·approached from the driver's side of the automobile. The 
· court, after stating it taxed one's credulity to believe plain-
taff neither saw nor heard the train from her position in the 
·front seat, says that still because of her youth and inexper-
~ ience and because of the other circumstances outlined above, 
there was some doubt as to whether she was negligent. 
None of the extenuating circumstances surrounding 
:this case are present in our instant case. 
Cowan v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co.,_ 56 Utah 94, 189 P. 599, 
;: is the next case we find dealing with the duty of a passenger 
, in an automobile at a railroad crossing. It is a companion 
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case of Montague v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co. Plaintiff relies 0~ 
this case in support of her position, but an analysis show~ 
it is not really helpful to her. Plaintiff Cowan was a 20-year. 
old girl riding in the same automobile as Miss Montague, 
In addition to the circumstances as to partially obscured 
vision mentioned in the Montague case, plaintiff was riding 
in the rear seat of the automobile with another passenger 
seated on her lap. Miss Cowan was not familiar with the 
crossing where the accident occurred., She certainly did not 
have as good an opportunity as the driver to observe the 
train. The court rules that the question of whether a pass· 
enger was guilty of contributory negligence should be left 
to the jury unless that question is free from substantial 
doubt. It then concludes there was substantial doubt as tc 
the matter, and under the extenuating circumstances of that 
case, we can have no quarrel with the court's determination. 
In the Cowan case, however, the court quotes the para· 
graph we have quoted above from the Lawrence case, and 
explains and reaffirms that rule as follows: 
"The exerpt quoted from the Lawrence case i1 
good law when applied to the undisputed facts of thaj 
case and to any other case where the facts arE 
similar. * * * Lawrence, by reason of the facl 
that he sat in the front seat with the driver, had tht 
same, if not a better, opportunity than the driver t1 
keep a lookout for and to hear the warning signal1 
of the on-coming train, and to see its approach. 11 
view, therefore, of Lawrence's position in the auto 
mobile, he was required t:o make vigilant use of hi 
senses, and to exercise ordinary care to avoid inju'f'JJ 
In his case the evidence was clear andl free from sub 
stantial doubt that his conduct did not measure ~ 
to the requirement of the law" (Italics ours). 
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If such was clear in the Law rcn ce case, how much 
clearer it is in the case under consideration, where the plain-
tiff not only sat in the front seat, but had a clearer view of 
:the train at all times than did the driver. We submit that it 
is a matter free from substantial doubt that Mrs. Hudson 
did not make vigilant use, or any use, of her senses to a void 
injury to herself. If the rule of the Lawrence case, as ex-
. plained and reaffirmed in the Cow an case, is the rule in this 
jurisdiction, Mrs. Hudson must be held contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law. See also Parramore v. Denver & R. 
G. W. R. Co. (8th Circuit, Utah) 5 F. 2d 912. 
Earle et al. v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Corporation et al., 
109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877, does not overrule the Lawrence 
case. Aside from the fact that it did not appear what posi-
tion in the car the plaintiffs occupied, and vegetation par-
. tially obstructed the view of the train (at least it does not 
. appear free from substantial doubt that the plaintiffs had 
: as good or better opportunity than the driver to see the 
train), the duty sought to be imposed on the passengers 
• was a greater duty than that imposed in the Lawrence 
: case. It is true, the plaintiffs saw the crossing, but it does 
not appear that they could have seen the train approaching 
. the crossing. The defendant sought to charge plaintiffs with 
: negligence for failing to warn the driver of the crossing. 
We concede that a passenger should not have to warn the 
I . 
driver every time they approach a railroad crossing. But 
it is not unreasonable to say, as the court said in the Lawr-
ence case, that when a passenger has as good or better op-
, portunity than the driver to observe an approaching train 
I 
when crossing a railroad track he ought at least to take a 
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cursory glance. The Earle case is not at all similar to the 
Lawrence case or to our present case. 
Atwood v. Utah Light & R. Co., 44 Utah 366, 140 P. 137, 
is cited in most of the Utah cases and is relied upon by the 
plaintiff in her brief. This is not a railroad crossing case 
and is authority only for the unquestioned propostions that 
a driver's negligence is not imputed to a guest, and the duty 
imposed upon a guest is not identical to that imposed upon 
the driver. 
Finally, the recent case of Folkman v. Jensen, ... Utah 
... , 218 P. 2d 682, should be mentioned. It cannot be said 
that this case overrules the Lawrence case. This does not 
involve a railroad crossing. As the court said, Patterson 
Avenue in Ogden is not such as to create a condition of im· 
minent danger, as is a railroad crossing. Plaintiff held an 
infant child, and her attention was directed toward caring 
for it and for another small child in the rear seat of the 
automobile. There was no reason for her to be apprehensiv~ 
and it could not be said her failure to look was negligencE 
free from substantial doubt. 
We see, then, that the Utah court has been consistenj 
throughout in its rulings with respect to the duty of ~ 
passenger. Extenuating circumstances may exist in a par 
ticular case which will lower the standard of care require( 
of a passenger. There are no extenuating circumstance: 
which lower the reasonable standard required of Mrs 
Hudson. Her attention was diverted, it is true, but it wa: 
negligently diverted. If we are to excuse her complete lacl 
of care, we can do so only by casting aside the Lawrenc 
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::__ case and the sound reasoning behind it and hold in defiance 
of fundamental principles of the law of negligence that a 
person can close his eyes in the face of imminent danger 
and placidly rely on another person to see him through that 
danger. 
Plaintiff seeks to explain her complete lack of care. In 
discussing the Earle case at page 25 of her brief she states 
that she had concluded Mrs. Jones was a careful driver 
and so relied upon her. It is true that if a passenger observes 
the driver is reckless, she has a duty to avoid the conse-
quences of that recklessness. But this is not her only duty. 
_ She has the duty imposed by the Lawrence case, and she 
cannot explain away that duty by reference to the conduct 
of the driver. Plaintiff states the driver knew she was ap-
- proaching a crossing and so plaintiff could rely upon her. 
This, again, might explain away one duty of a passenger, 
but not the duty imposed by the Lawrence case. Then she 
states the train crew saw the car as it approached the 
- tracks. How can we explain or analyze the conduct of one 
party by reference to knowledge in the hands of someone 
else? The same observation is true of her fourth statement 
on page 26. Finally, she says the train was to the rear and 
_ .. above the car, and she could see it only by looking up and 
back. This is contrary to the undisputed fact disclosed by 
the testimony. For 100 feet as the auto approached almost 
at right angles to the track the train was almost directly in 
front of the automobile. The fact is, the car passed the 
train (R. 201), and in any event after the car negotiated 
the final turn and started up toward the track, she could 
have seen the train in time to warn the driver and stop the 
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car had she but exercised slight care for her own safety by 
making a cursory glance. There is no explanation for her 
conduct other than that she was negligent. There are no 
extenuating circumstances at all, and the matter is free 
from substantial doubt. 
The defendant hesitates to extend its brief by referring 
to cases from other jurisdictions. The court has itself ex-
haustively researched this subject in the past. The court is 
undoubtedly aware that a great many jurisdictions impose 
a greater duty upon the passenger than the very reasonable 
duty imposed by the Lawrence case. 
Referring to cases from other jurisdictions serves little 
useful purpose for in a case of this type the facts are so 
controlling. A brief examination of the cases cited by plain-
tiff in her brief at page 30 illustrat~s the truth of this. Thus 
Atlanta and W. P.R. Co. v. McCord, (Ga.) 189 S. E. 403, 
the first case cited by plaintiff, is one in which the facts 
surrounding the collision are not stated in the opinion. The 
opinion is therefore of little value for we do not know what 
facts the court had in mind and what facts the language used 
in the opinion was applied to. 
Gorman v. Franklin, (Mo.) 117 S. W. 2d 289, the next 
case cited by plaintiff, is one in which the train approached 
the crossing from the east and the view 300 feet down thE 
track was obstructed by a bluff. The automobile in whicl 
plaintiff's intestate was a passenger stopped 10 feet fron 
the track, and plaintiff's intestate himself looked for at 
approaching train. The car was then started, drove upo1 
the tracks and was struck. Plaintiff's intestate, the guest 
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~t was alert and did look, and the court analyzes the speed of 
~>the car and the train, concludes the train was more than 
=-~ 300 feet away and thus out of view when the guest and 
~ driver looked, and decides that while it was a close case 
it could not be said as a matter of law that the guest was 
negligent. 
Carson v. Thompson, (Mo.) 161 S. W. 2d 995, is a case 
· --' in which four men were riding in the front seat of a car, 
the plaintiff sitting on the lap of one of the other occupants. 
:~: It could certainly not be said that the plaintiff thus had an 
opportunity equal with the driver to observe the approach-
ing train. For a Missouri case in which the facts are more 
__ nearly analogous to the facts in our -present case, we refer 
the court to Cox et aL v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 
9 s. w. 2d 96. 
Gifford v. Pa. R. Co., (N. J.) 196 A. 679, is a case in 
which plaintiff's intestate was riding on the car fender away 
_ _ from the approaching train, and so the court says his view 
- was obstructed. Furthermore, the court points out, since 
· both the driver and the guest on the running ·board were 
.. 
killed, for all that appears the guest may have exercised 
due care, may have seen the approaching train, but because 
·- · of his position was powerless to do anything about it. 
:.-::. Anstine v. Pa. R. Co., (Pa.) 20 A. 2d 774, is a case of 
a minor plaintiff asleep at the time of the crossing accident. 
For a Pennsylvania case in which the court holds the pass-
-': enger contributorily negligent as a matter of law under a 
:..-: fact situation similar to that under consideration, see Rhodes 
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 147 A. 854. ~~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
The case of Valera v. Reading Co., (Pa.) 36 A. 2d 644 , 
is one in which plaintiff passenger was alert, looked up and 
down the track when the driver stopped at the track, but 
the crossing was enveloped in darkness and there was evi-
dence that no lights were burning on the approaching train, 
and so it could not be said as a matter of law that plaintiff 
should have seen the train in time to warn the driver. 
We are unable to locate the case of Wichita Valley Ry. 
Co. v. Durrett, and so cannot analyze the fact situation there 
present. 
Gulf, M. & 0. R. Co. v. Underwood, (Tenn.) 187 S. W. 
2d 777, is one in which plaintiff guest was riding in the 
front seat. The night was dark and somewhat foggy, and 
it was uncontradicted "that the unlighted freight car loomed 
suddenly before the automobile and that the collision ensued 
immediately, with no opportunity for the driver to stop the 
car and a fortiori with no opportunity for the guest to warn 
the driver or take other steps for her own safety." The court 
approves a previous ruling that: "Of course, if an adult, 
who while riding in a vehicle driven by another sees, or 
ought by due diligence to see, a danger not obvious to the 
driver, or who sees that the driver is incompetent or care-
less, or is not taking proper precautions, it is his duty to 
give some warning of danger, and a failure to do so is negli-
gence." Tested by this rule Mrs. Hudson was negligent, for 
by exercising due diligence she should have seen the train 
and then given some warning rather than permit Mrs. Jones 
to drive carelessly upon the tracks. 
Cox v. Polson Logging Co., (Wash.) 138 P. 2d 169, is a 
case in which the car in which plaintiff's intestate was rid-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
53 
ing approached a dark, unlighted crossing at night. Visibil-
, ity was largely obstructed, and the passenger did not know 
~ they were in the vicinity of a crossing. We do not argue that 
a passenger must be alert every minute he rides in an auto-
mobile. For a Washington case in which the facts more near-
ly approach those under consideration, see Sadler v. North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co., 203 P. 10. Here plaintiff's intestate was 
sitting in the front seat of the automobile on the side from 
which the train approached. In reversing a verdict for the 
plaintiff the court said : 
"* * * the jury must have found that Sadler 
looked and listened as he approached the railroad 
track, and therefore exercised reasonable care, or 
took the same precautions as a reasonably prudent 
man would have taken for his protection ; and this 
in face of the fact, as testified to by Ball, the driver, 
that Sadler said nothing to him, and in face of the 
facts that the train could have been seen for a dis-
tance of 70 feet back from the track 1,000 feet away, 
and in plenty of time to warn the driver, or to have 
left the truck. In face of these undisputed facts we 
feel obliged to say that the matter of Sadler's con-
tributory negligence was conclusively established, 
and left no fact upon that question for the jury to 
determine." 
In Parsons v. N. Y. Central R. Co., (W.Va.) 34 S. E. 
334, plaintiff, a passenger, was alert and looked down th~ 
tracks, but his view was obstructed. Because of the way 
the truck was constructed only the driver had clear vision. 
The car was brought to a stop and plaintiff moved out of the 
way to give the driver a clear view. The court held that the 
jury could have found the plaintiff did all he reasonably 
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could do under the circumstances. For West Virginia cases 
more nearly in point with the facts under consideration see 
Gilkerson v. BaUimore & 0. R. Co., 41 S. E. 2d 188; and 
Waller v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 152 S. E. 13. 
Koscuik v. Sherf, (Wis.) 272 N. W. 8, is a case in which 
the passenger was una ware of the presence of the railroad 
crossing until it was too late for him to do anything about it. 
In Chicago and E. I. Railway Co. v. Felling, (Ind.) 
200 N. E. 441, plaintiff, a passenger, was alert and looking 
and listening for trains. It was nighttime and there were no 
visible lights on the train. Defendant relied on an earlier 
Indiana case (Pennsylvanm R. Co. v. Huss, 180 N. E. 919) 
which held that if "ordinary observation" would disclose the 
presence of a train, the passenger was negligent in not seeing 
it. The court held that it could not be said as a matter of 
law that ordinary observation would have disclosed the 
presence of the unlighted train. 
In Finley v. Lowden, (Iowa) 277 N. W. 487, the court 
states in its opinion that the train was visible only from 
the driver's seat, and in order for the passenger to see it 
would have been necessary for him to lean over in front of 
the driver, put his head out the driver's window and look 
backward. The driver himself looked twice, but the court 
said that under the circumstances it could not say that the 
plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
looked. 
In Frideres v. Lowden, (Iowa) 17 N. W. 2d 396, the 
court points out that the passenger had sat up all the night 
before with the body of a dead aunt and he was drowsing or 
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~;: resting as the car proceeded toward the crossing ; that he 
was entirely unfamiliar with the crossing; that the train 
<: approached from the direction opposite that in which the 
passenger faced ; and that the sun was shining in his face, 
there being a sunshade only on the driver's side. 
' .... ": ~ 
The facts are not stated in the opinion in Lang v. 
Chicago & N. lV. Ry. Co., (Minn.) 295 N. W. 57, the court 
merely stating that the passenger does not have the same 
duty as a driver and that the defendant had failed to sustain 
- the burden of proving deceased, seated in the rear seat of the 
- automobile, was contributorily negligent. 
The California court alone seems to support plaintiff's 
position, holding that only when a guest performs some negli-
gent overt act contributing to the collision can he be held 
~ contributorily negligent as a matter of law. We believe such 
__ a rule is not only contrary to the law established in Utah 
but contrary to the general principles of negligence. 
In principle, circumstances may impose a positive duty 
to act as well as a duty not to act negligently if one 
is to exercise reasonable care, and, in principle, whenever 
a question is free from substantial doubt, there is nothing 
-- to submit to the- jury whether it concerns a person occupy-
,_ ing the position of driver, of passenger, or any other position 
in the law. 
For a good opinion which thoroughly treats the sub-
ject of the contributory negligence of an automobile pass-
enger involved in a railroad crossing accident, and which 
treats of a fact situation similar to that under consideration, 
and in which the South Dakota Supreme Court analyzes the 
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law similar to the manner in which it has in the past been 
analyzed by the Utah Supreme Court, we refer to the court to 
Ulrikson v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 268 N. W. 369. 
Decisions from the Federal courts are not always help-
ful because the Federal courts seem to impose a greater duty 
upon a passenger than has been imposed by the Utah court. 
The language of the Eighth Circuit Court in Parramore et 
al. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 5 F. 2d 912, is helpful to our 
analysis however. The facts were that the passenger sat in 
the front seat of the automobile on the side from which the 
train approached. The court said: 
"The driver of the car was bound by his legal 
duty carefully to operate and control the speed and 
the direction of the car, and to look and listen for 
engines and trains on each side and in front of him 
before he attempted to cross the track on which this 
engine came. Unconsciously he may have relaxed his 
vigilance and failed, as he did, to look to the north 
from the time he crossed the tracks of the Oregon 
Short Line Railroad, because he, was trusting Mr. 
Parramore, who sat on the north side of him and had 
the better opportunity to look and listen for engines 
and trains coming from the north, to give him notice 
of the approach of engines from that direction. How-
ever that may be, Mr. Parramore had the best op-
portunity of anyone in the automobile to look, 
listen, watch, and act to prevent the collision and the 
injury that might result from engines coming from 
the north, and his legal duty so' to do was not less 
clear and imperative under the evidence in this case 
than was that of the driver of the car so to do. He 
had nothing else to do or to distract his attention. If 
he had discharged his duty to look, the car would un-
doubtedly have been stopped before it reached the 
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track on which the engine was moving, and the 
collision and death would have been avoided. In this 
state of the record there seems to be no escape from 
the conclusion that the evidence so conclusively estab-
~: · lished the negligence of l\ir. Parramore, which direct-
ly contributed to cause the collision and death, that 
there was no material issue for the jury to try and 
that it was the duty of the court to instruct them, as 
it did, to return a verdict for the defendant." 
See also: 
Hooker v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (Kans.) 8 P. 
2d 394. 
Buchhein v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (Kans.) 
75 P. 2d 280. 
Butler v. Darden, (Va.) 53 S. E. 2d 146. 
WiUy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (Colo.) 
172 P. 2d 958. 
Alanza v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., (La.) 32 So. 2d 
341. 
Gr.ant v. Chica.go, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Mont.) 
252-P. 382. 
Sherris v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (Mont.) 175 
P. 269. 
Boscarello v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 
(Conn.) 152: A. 61. 
An analysis of the U tab cases and of the cases from 
other jurisdictions leads to the conclusion that Mrs. Hudson 
was, under the circumstances, charged with the duty of 
making reasonable observation for an approaching train. 
The evidence conclusively shows that she failed to do so, and 
also conclusively shows that had she done so she would have 
observed the approaching train in time to avoid the ac-
cident. There is no substantial doubt as to the facts in the 
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case and it follows that she must be held guilty of contribu. 
tory negligence as a matter of law. 
POINT Ill 
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IS 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE 
CASE AT BAR. 
Without settting it out as a separate point for argument
1 
counsel for appellant under their Point III and on the last 
two pages of their brief argue the doctrine of last clear 
chance. They include this argument under their Point II1 
where in they state that the appellant was not guilty oi 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. Appellant mus1 
remember that the last clear chance doctrine applies onb 
under circumstances where negligence of a plaintiff is con· 
ceded and the negligence of the plaintiff is voided by thE 
claim that the defendant had a last clear chance to avoic 
the injury. 
Counsel state on page 32 of their brief: "There cer· 
tainly was a point at which the train crew knew full wei 
that the car was going up on to the tracks." That 'is verJ 
true, and at that time the crew concluded-and justifiabll 
so-that the car would pass over the tracks safely ahea1 
of the train, and it would have done so had not the plaintif 
exclaimed: "Oh, my God," thereby causing her driver, Mrs 
Jones, to slam on her brakes and stop her car right on th 
track in front of the train. 
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At that tim~ when the crew concluded that Mrs. Jones 
would continue onto the tracks-the train was 50 feet away. 
The train could not possibly have stopped and there was no 
necessity for it to stop because had the automobile continued 
without stopping it would have passed over the crossing 
: _ safely, but at the time Mrs. Jones stopped her car on the 
-~.: track the train could not possibly have been stopped, and any 
slowing of it, if such had been possible, would not have 
avoided the injury in any way. 
It must be remembered that the injury to plaintiff as 
__ far as outward physical injury was concerned was not 
serious. Her main claim for damages arises as a result of 
_ an embolism which followed the injury, a phlebothrombosis 
as referred to by one doctor (Exhibit 9), arising from a 
:.-~ bruise on plaintiff's leg. Thus any question of the serious-
ness of the accident or the possibility of her injuries being 
_ less serious if the train could have been slowed cannot 
_ possibly be involved herein, and the evidence shows that the 
. ·-
train could not have been stopped and there is no evidence 
as to whether it could have been slowed appreciably. As a 
matter of fact it could not have been slowed down even 
; -:; because in the few seconds it would take for the air to go 
:::~-. through the air lines to the brake cylinders the train would 
~- have been to the crossing before the brakes could have taken 
.. -~ effect, the only evidence in the record being that it would 
~~,· take seven seconds for the air to equalize back through the 
·-~-- lines. In seven seconds the car in which plaintiff was riding, 
traveling at the rate of 26.4 feet per second, would be back 
. ~;- somewhere in excess of 150 feet from the crossing. Clearly 
counsel would not suggest that it was incumbent upon the 
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train crew to apply the emergency brakes and stop the train 
because they saw the automobile driving along the parallel 
strip at 18 miles an hour when there is no question but 
what the automobile could have stopped at any time, at least 
within the 75 feet after making the turn to proceed directly 
toward the crossing. 
Counsel also state at page 32: "A sounding of the whistle 
most certainly would have stopped the car." That is an-
other assumption which counsel are not at liberty to make 
under the circumstances. A sounding of the whistle, if we 
believe that it was not otherwise sounded, may have had 
exactly the same effect that plaintiff's exclamation did. It 
might have caused the driver to slam on her brakes and 
bring her car to a stop on the tracks just as happened when 
plaintiff screamed. Nevertheless, a sounding of the train 
whistle while the operator of the automobile was still ap-
proaching the crossing at a time when such automobile driver 
could still stop and while her negligence and the negligence 
of the plaintiff was still active in their progress toward the 
track would provide no basis for the application of the last 
clear chance. The car and its occupants at that time were 
in no peril and their movements were not such as to indicate 
any hazards to members of the train crew. From that point 
on it was purely a matter of continuing negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff herself and her driver. 
In this argument as urged by appellant, counsel seeks to 
impose an additional and a greater duty upon the defendant 
by reason of the fact that the crew saw the automobile ap· 
proaching-and in a manner such as automobiles normall~ 
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· · approach a crossing. Upon this phase we refer again to 
· that portion of our brief having to do with the fact that 
.:: signals were given and the fact that the evidence of negli-
~ gence produced by plaintiff is not sufficient to prove a failure 
to give a warning. Again we urge the court that the evidence 
does not show that the whistle was not blown, and even 
~~ should the court cons_ider that plaintiff's testimony with 
-~respect to the whistle would amount to positive testimony, 
clearly her evidence concerning the bell was not sufficient 
- and did not rise above what would be considered bare nega-
- · tive testimony and would not be sufficient to warrant a 
- jury in finding that the bell was not rung. 
Plaintiff would have the court believe that the train 
crew knew the driver of the car was going to drive onto the 
- crossing and stop in front of the train. The evidence fails 
~ to substantiate her position in this respect. Plaintiff's coun-
sel sought unsuccessfully to lead the crew into such an ad-
:::- mission on cross-examination, but there is nothing in the 
:: evidence to take this case out of the general rule applied al-
::: most everywhere and affirmed by the Utah Court in Pippy 
V. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 79 Utah 439, 11 P. 2d 305: 
"Train operators may assume, until the situation 
otherwise discloses, that one approaching a railway 
track will yield precedent to the right of way and 
will exercise ordinary care to take care of himself 
* * * " 
Even though the crew saw the automobile passing the 
train on the nearby road, they were certainly not required 
to anticipate the occupants would turn onto the crossing 
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and attempt to cross the tracks unless such crossing could 
be made in safety. 
In any event there was clearly no last clear chance 
negligence in the case. If the railroad was negligent, the 
occupants of the automobile were negligent, and their negli. 
gence was active and concurring right up to the time the 
automobile was on the track. Plaintiff's negligence had not 
come to rest, leaving her in a position of peril from which 
she could not reasonably escape. 
Ryan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 
P. 71. 
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 
276, 90 P. 402. 
After the auto in which plaintiff was riding drove onbl 
the track and stopped and the plaintiff was in her positio11 
of danger on the track, there was no clear opportunity fm 
the crew to avoid the collision. The plaintiff was not in an~ 
position of peril at any other time. 
Van Wagoner et al. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 11l 
Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293. 
Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co., ... Utah 
198 P. 2d 459. 
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We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err 
in directing a verdict for the defendant and against the 
plaintiff and the judgment of the trial court should be 
· ~affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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